Does the Gap in Family-friendly Policies Drive the Family Gap? by Nielsen, Helena Skyt et al.
 
 
Does the Gap in Family-friendly Policies 












A segregation of the labour market into a family-friendly and a non-family friendly 
sector has the effect that women self-select into the sectors depending on institutional 
constraints, preferences for family-friendly working conditions and expected wage 
differences. We find that neglecting the sector dimension tends to understate the effect 
of birth-related interruptions in both sectors. The combined effect of a large 
depreciation effect and no recovery means that females in the non-family friendly 
sector (e.g. private sector) are punished severely after childbirth. In the family friendly 
sector (e.g. public sector), we find complete catch up.  
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1.  Introduction  
In the family gap literature, analyses of the potential self-selection into jobs with 
‘family-friendly’ working conditions are scarce. However, substantial differences in 
family-friendly working conditions are observed to exist for different segments of the 
labour market. And, if the tastes for these family-friendly working conditions vary 
among different groups of the labour market, the selection into these occupations may 
not be random. The workers who assign the highest value to good working conditions 
occupy the jobs characterised by these job features.  
Occupational segregation induced by different family-friendly working conditions may 
affect the gender wage gap of which the family gap is a main component. Various 
attempts have been made to explain the family gap in general and the child-penalties in 
particular (Waldfogel (1998), Budig & England (2001), Phipps et al. (2001), Datta 
Gupta & Smith (2002)). Among these explanations are: Foregone work experience 
during birth-related interruptions, depreciation of human capital and signalling effects. 
Though these factors explain part of the gap, a significant part is still left unexplained. 
Generally, the existing studies on birth-related interruption effects and child penalty 
show significantly negative interruption effects that may die out over time and wage 
penalties in the private sector (Datta Gupta & Smith (2000), Verner (2001)). However, 
estimates of the child penalty for the public sector show mixed and dubious results. If 
significant at all, ‘penalties’ in the public sector are most often found to be positive 
(e.g. Datta Gupta & Smith (2000)). Therefore, one may hypothesize that rational 
females who expect to have children choose the public sector deliberately to collect the 
benefits of family-friendly policies and to avoid the penalty of the private sector.    2
This is exactly the main hypothesis of the present paper, where we investigate whether 
the family gap is driven by self-selection into the public and private sectors. We 
analyse child penalties and interruption effects in a model that allows for endogenous 
sector choice. The idea is that individuals cluster in the public and private sectors 
depending on their preferences for wage versus working conditions. We test this 
hypothesis empirically through an analysis of self-selection into the public and private 
sectors using the endogenous switching model suggested by Lee (1978). Preston 
(1990) also applies this framework to estimate selection into the white-collar non-profit 
sector.  The estimation procedure takes into account the potential endogeneity of the 
sector choice; it may be that unobserved characteristics affecting the choice of sector 
also have an effect on wages, which could bias parameter estimates. The selection 
effects of main interest are those due to expected wage gain, higher compensation 
during maternity leave and child/family variables. In the career interruption and 
“family gap” literature, the endogeneity issue may be important, though it is usually 
neglected. Also, fertility is likely to be endogenous, and therefore we use an 
instrumental variable approach.  
In the empirical analysis we apply a Danish register based data set that includes very 
detailed, high quality information on e.g. income, demographics, and education on a 
yearly basis along with information on the sector choice of parents, which is used as 
exclusion restrictions in the econometric model. Furthermore, the individual event 
history in terms of periods of employment, unemployment, maternal leave, and 
publicly subsidised leave (child rearing, sabbatical, or educational) is known on a 
weekly basis. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section two reviews the existing studies within 
the literature. Section three describes a Danish case of a sector with family-friendly   3
working conditions, namely the public sector. Section four presents the theoretical 
framework. Section five describes the data used in the empirical part of the paper, 
whereas section six describes the empirical methods. In section seven, the estimation 
results are presented and section eight concludes. 
 
2.  Literature 
In the earnings literature, the interruption effects on the earnings of women have been 
studied extensively with a particular focus on the interruptions related to childbirth. 
The branches of this literature range from the traditional literature on gender wage gap 
and family gap, i.e. estimation of ‘child penalties’ (e.g. Joshi (1990), Waldfogel 
(1998), and Phipps (2001)) to studies focusing on interruption effects as such (e.g. 
Mincer & Polachek (1974), Mincer & Ofek (1982), and Albrecht et al. (1999)).  
 “The family gap” is defined as the earnings differential between mothers and childless 
women ceteris paribus. It has been investigated for various countries using various 
specifications of the estimated models. The early studies (e.g. Joshi (1990) and Joshi et 
al. (1999)) have included dummies for having children and eventually for being 
married in the earnings equations. These analyses show that having children and the 
subsequent increased use of part-time work decrease the hourly pay of women. This 
decrease is mainly attributed to the return to part-time employment and loss of 
seniority (i.e. firm-specific human capital) with the current employer. When the family 
gap is investigated over time and decomposed, it is found that the gap is of the same 
magnitude in 1991 as it was in 1978. The decomposition, however, shows that 
explanations for the family gap have changed over time.    4
These simple measures of the family gap may suffer from some problems. One is that 
potential rather than actual work experience is often included in the earnings 
equations. This problem is essential when women are studied, simply because mothers 
are more likely to interrupt their working careers than non-mothers. Thus, using 
potential work experience may be severely misleading. 
Waldfogel (1998) finds for UK and the US that the negative effect of children is 
reduced when actual work experience is included rather than potential work 
experience. It is also found that access to job-protected maternal leave has substantial 
positive wage effects in both countries investigated, offsetting some of the negative 
wage effect from children. This is explained by the higher propensity of returning to 
the former employer after childbirth, hence diminishing depreciation of firm-specific 
human capital and retaining good job matches. In the Danish case with mandatory  job-
protected maternal leave Datta Gupta & Smith (2002) find that, when they control for 
foregone human capital accumulation during periods out of the labour market, the birth 
of a child does lead to a temporary wage loss compared to childless women. However, 
this earnings effect vanishes around the age of 45 years. 
Hence, controlling for actual rather than potential work experience reduces the 
estimated child penalty. Another effect that may (mistakenly) be reflected in the 
measure of the child penalty if not controlled for is human capital depreciation during 
child-related interruptions. For Canada, Phipps et al. (2001) find that not only failure to 
acquire human capital but also depreciation of human capital significantly reduce the 
penalty associated with ever having a child.  
Budig & England (2001) also investigate the wage penalty for motherhood. When 
interruptions, lost experience and part-time work are taken into account, the child   5
penalty is reduced by nearly 50%. The authors explain the remaining child penalty by 
decreased productivity of the women following motherhood and/or employer 
discrimination against mothers.  
For Denmark, Verner (2001) examines the earnings effect of career interruptions 
during the 1980s. The results of the analysis show evidence of linear depreciation 
during unemployment, both in the public and private sectors. Also here, a significant 
part of the loss can be attributed to loss of firm-specific human capital. The earnings 
effects seem to be most persistent in the public sector both for interruptions due to 
unemployment and non-participation.  
Albrecht et al. (1999) investigate earnings effects from career interruptions by the use 
of a Swedish data set, and they also estimate the effects separately for private- and 
public-sector employees. Their results show that women are punished neither in the 
public nor the private sector for taking parental leave, whereas household time and 
unemployment are punished in both sectors. As found for Denmark (Datta Gupta & 
Smith (2002)), women in the public sector get a premium from having children when 
interruptions are controlled for.
1  
The surveyed literature illustrates that significant differences in the wage determination 
process across sectors exist, also when the focus is on interruption effects and the child 
premium/penalty. The lower level of earnings in the public sector is a consequence of 
both a lower initial wage level and a flatter earnings profile of the public employees. 
Because the rather scarce evidence shows that also the negative consequences of 
children and career interruptions are smaller in the public sector, females may 
incorporate this information when they plan their working career and fertility and make 
their sector choice. Especially, the surprising finding of positive effects of children in   6
the public sector indicates that the sector selection process may be important and 
should be examined in more detail. If the selection into sectors depends on the 
expected number of interruptions and family-friendly working conditions, neglecting 
the endogeneity of sector choice as done in the previous studies (e.g. Albrecht et al. 
(1999), Datta Gupta & Smith (2000), and Verner (2001)) yields biased estimates of the 
interruption effects. The endogenous switching model suggested by Lee (1978) may be 
used to correct for this potential bias. This course of action has for example been used 
by Preston (1990). She analyses gender wage gaps in white-collar occupations in the 
private sector and considers both the profit and the non-profit sector.  
Another source of bias in the attempt to identify the effects of children is the potential 
endogeneity of fertility measures. If the fertility choice depends on expected earnings, 
then the estimated effects of children on earnings may be biased and the same goes for 
the interruptions associated with childbirths. 
 
3.  The Danish public sector: A case of family-friendly working conditions 
In the public sector in Denmark there is a long tradition for focusing on working 
conditions rather than wages. Recently, wage growth has been extremely low in the 
public sector compared to the private sector, and at the same time working conditions 
have improved considerably. To mention a few examples, pension schemes have 
improved, the number of working hours has declined, rights to vacation have been 
extended, and entitlements to ‘care-days’ and parental leave schemes have improved 
both in terms of wage compensation and duration. 
Though a similar trend is seen in the private sector, it is by no means as pronounced as 
it is in the public sector. This is just a cementation of the trend seen in the 1980s as   7
described by Rosholm & Smith (1996). They describe the differences in the gender 
wage gap in the public and private sectors during the 1980s. They find that the wage 
twist policy resulting in lower earnings growth in the public sector due to female 
domination in public-sector employment has been a major determinant of an increasing 
gender wage gap. The Danish labour market is characterised by a high level of 
occupational gender segregation (Dolado et. al. (2001)), and this relates to the high rate 
of female employment in the public sector.  The share of female labour in public-sector 
employment has increased over a 30-year period to more than 65% in 1997. In the 
private sector the share is much lower, varying from 10% in the construction sector to 
a maximum of 46% in the financial sector. Both wage level and wage growth at the 
aggregate level are generally lower in the public sector. Combining the facts of 
improved working conditions, declining real wages and increasing proportion of 
women, we interpret this as a strong indication of different tastes for working 
conditions across gender and sectors. 












































Source: Results of central wage negotiations as reported in the Statistical Ten-Year Review. The 
annually negotiated wage regulation has been added. 
   8
For the public sector, figure 1 shows the centrally negotiated wage growth in real terms 
and improved working conditions as measured by costs to the employer. It is striking 
that the centrally negotiated wage growth in real terms has been negative in more than 
half of the years since 1985
2, whereas working conditions have improved continuously. 
Hence, it seems that public-sector employees are less concerned with wages than 
working conditions.
  
Among working conditions, the leave schemes are of special interest in the present 
context (see Appendix A for a detailed description). During the last two decades, the 
complete system of parental leaves has changed substantially in Denmark. 
Significantly prolonged entitlement periods and increases in the coverage of lost 
earnings during parental leaves have changed the participation behaviour of parents 
and of mothers, in particular. The parental leave schemes were very limited in the 
1970s, but in the 1980s the duration of parental leave was extended and became 
generous in an international comparison (OECD (2001, 2002)). In the 1990s, it became 
possible to supplement the usual maternity/paternal leave with a parental/child care 
leave, resulting in some parents (in most cases mothers) being absent from the labour 
market for more than a year following childbirth. From 2002, this supplement has been 
replaced by a one-year maternity leave, of which a part may be postponed. In principle, 
the coverage of the leave schemes is universal but there seems to be a tendency for 
women in the public sector to take more parental leaves than their peers in the private 
sector. This may reflect that this is an accepted behaviour due to the fact that family-
friendly policies, including full salary during parental leave, to a higher extent than in 
the private sector are a part of the legislation for public-sector employees. If women 
take these sector differences into account when they plan their working career and 
choose the sector, there is a possibility that women with preferences for children,   9




4.  Theoretical framework 
An underlying presumption of the selection hypothesis in this paper is that women self-
select into the segment of the labour market that satisfies their demand for family-
friendly policies relative to wages. Altonji and Blank (1999) present a model on 
discrimination and occupational exclusion that is easily modified to capture the most 
important effects expected to explain the choice of a family-friendly vs. a non-family-
friendly sector. Altonji and Blank (1999) consider the case of discrimination against 
women per se and selection into two different occupations.  
Assume that there is one composite good in the economy. This good is a product of 
output from two sectors, the family-friendly sector and the non family-friendly sector 
(j=FF, NFF). These two sectors differ in terms of technology and working conditions. 
Furthermore, there are two types of workers mothers and non-mothers (g=M,NM) who 
differ in terms of preferences, bargaining power, and possibly also in terms of 
productivity. One could imagine that the technology used in the family-friendly sector 
to a higher degree than the non family-friendly sector is compatible with individualized 
flexible working hours, i.e. re-scheduling working hours to facilitate child-rearing 
activities has only minor effects on productivity (for instance ministries offer flexible 
working hours). Alternatively, jobs in the family-friendly sector could be less 
demanding in terms of unplanned overtime hours. This is likely to make mothers more 
productive in the family-friendly sector relative to the non family-friendly sector.   10
Furthermore, the balancing of working responsibilities and family activities is likely to 
increase utility of mothers. 
Let λj denote the productivity of mothers relative to non-mothers in sector j. Then 
labour services in sector j amount to: 
(1)  Mj j NMj j L L N λ + =  
The marginal product of an extra unit of labour input, Nj, in sector j is Gj(N1,N2) where 
G is the production function for the composite good. Wages for non-mothers equal the 
marginal product: 
(2)  j NMj G W = , 
while wages for mothers equal the (potentially lower) marginal product minus a wage 
penalty, dj: 
(3)  j j j Mj G d W λ ) 1 ( − = . 
The wage penalty may exist due to discrimination; employers may associate disutility 
with employing mothers or they may expect the productivity of mothers to be lower 
than their true productivity; this is termed statistical discrimination. Also, mothers may 
be less mobile because of their dependence on childcare opportunities, schooling etc. 
This contributes to lowering the bargaining power of mothers in wage negotiations 
because their outside opportunities are less valuable and may reduce the resulting 
wages.  
It is assumed that aggregate labour supply of the two groups is inelastic and that 
markets clear. Actual relative supply of type g is given by 


















gNFF θ    11
where Xg captures the effects of social pressure into the family-friendly sector and/or 
institutional constraints on the costs and benefits that the individual derives from 
working in the non family-friendly sector relative to working in the family-friendly 
sector. For example social pressure captures the pattern of sex roles and social 
inheritance, while institutional constraints may be a low degree of compensation 
during maternity leave impeding motherhood. θg  is a taste parameter capturing 
preferences for hours flexibility, maternity leave schemes, job security and working 
conditions in general. It is seen that a higher degree of wage discrimination of mothers 
in the non family-friendly sector relative to the family-friendly sector induces mothers 
to choose the family-friendly sector. Also, lower productivity of mothers in the non 
family-friendly sector relative to the family-friendly sector adds to the self-selection of 
mothers into the family-friendly sector. 
The theory presented above leads to a selection equation where, among other things, 
the selection into sectors depends on motherhood status, wage-differences in the two 
sectors and institutional differences represented by the relative degree of compensation 
while on maternity leave. We test these hypotheses empirically in section 7. 
 
5.  Data 
In the following section, the data used for the econometric analysis are presented and 
some initial indications of the expected results are shown. 
5.1  Data source 
The original data set holds information on a representative sample of 5% of all Danish 
individuals in the 15-74-age bracket. Information stems from several registers all 
maintained by Statistics Denmark. The registers include variables describing income,   12
demographics, and education on a yearly basis. Furthermore, the individual event 
history in terms of periods of employment, unemployment, maternal leave, publicly 
subsidised leave (child rearing, sabbatical, or educational), and the residual category 
non-participation is known on a weekly basis. 
In the empirical analysis below, we use a 1997 cross sectional subsample of women 
aged 20-40 years who are employed more than 200 hours per year, who are not self-
employed, and not undertaking education. The lower age bound is chosen to exclude 
individuals who are in the state between two types of education, for instance high 
school and university. The upper age bound is chosen because of an age restriction on 
the availability information on the parents, used to construct the exclusion restriction 
applied in the econometric analysis. The analysis is performed using retrospective 
information on the labour market history. 
5.2  Descriptive statistics 
The endogenous variables in the models to be estimated are choice of sector and hourly 
wages. The outcome variable of interest in the analysis is log hourly wage. It is 
calculated from annual earnings and number of working hours. We use a very precise 
measure of working hours in this calculation using information on contributions to 
supplementary pension payments. We classify women as mothers if they have given 
birth to a child. Thus it is assumed that the presence of biological children is more 
important than the presence of stepchildren. It may be a problem if children in the 
household other than biological children of the woman affect her choices and actions.
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Table 1.  Number of children and hourly wages by sector (1997). 
 
 
Table 1 shows the number of children of the women in the sample and their average 
wages by number of children. Women without children amount to more than half of 
the women employed in the private sector, whereas only 38.8% of the women 
employed in the public sector are childless. The share of women with one child is 
almost the same in the two sectors, whereas more women in the public sector have 
more than one child. Mean hourly wages vary with sector, and the difference to some 
extent stems from the fact that women in the public sector are more likely to be 
mothers. The average wage for women with no children is slightly higher in the private 
sector than in the public sector. This difference increases with the number of children 
since wages in the public sector seem to decrease with the number of children whereas 
there is no distinct trend in the private sector. It therefore seems that in terms of raw 
wage averages, women with children are better off in the private sector. Despite that, a 
larger share of women in the public sector has more than one child. This may indicate 
that women employed in the public sector attach importance to other factors than 
Number of children Public sector Private sector Public sector Private sector
No children 38.50 52.01 125.48 127.16
1 child 18.86 18.23 125.30 131.34
2 children 30.86 23.77 123.93 131.94
3 children 9.89 5.06 123.99 128.59
4 children 1.61 0.80 122.39 126.22
5 or more children 0.27 0.14 114.53 116.69
Full sample 100.00 100.00 124.74 129.11
Share of women in each sector Hourly wages (DKK)  14
hourly wages and that they are rewarded differently from women in the private sector. 
The empirical analysis will shed more light on this issue. 
The information on interruptions consists of a subset of the spells created from the 
accurate event histories computed on a weekly basis. Incidences of unemployment and 
non-participation are registered from 1981 and onwards while maternity leave and 
parental leave in connection with childbirth can be traced back to 1984. Before 1984, 
maternity leave is included in the non-participation category. 
In 1994, three new types of publicly subsidized leave schemes were added: Child 
rearing leave, sabbatical leave and leave due to education. The length of these types of 
leaves is registered from 1995 and onwards.  
 














Note: In this table birth-related leave is defined as maternal leave possible followed immediately by 
child-rearing or sabbatical leave 
 
In Table 2, the mean durations of the observed spells are seen. Especially employment 
spells are on average longer in the private sector than in the public sector. Concerning 
the leave schemes associated with parenthood, not much difference is seen in terms of 
length of the spells. However, it is evident that more birth-related and childrearing 
leave spells takes place in the public sector and also the spells are slightly longer at the 
Duration of spells
(weeks) Mean N Share Mean N Share Mean N
Employment    51.43 103392 0.56 66.11 82153 0.44 57.93 185545
Unemployment     11.01 93009 0.56 11.90 72931 0.44 11.40 165940
Educational leave      24.55 1211 0.64 19.83 695 0.36 22.83 1906
Birth-related leave 28.28 14779 0.55 27.53 12180 0.45 27.94 26959
Child rearing leave    27.11 1100 0.61 26.46 702 0.39 26.86 1802
Sabbatical leave    27.25 88 0.69 28.00 40 0.31 27.48 128
Public sector Private sector All  15
mean. This may indicate differences in preferences for child-related leave schemes 
across sectors. 
6.  Methodology 
The wage effects of having children and choosing child-related career interruptions are 
found to differ across sectors (Albrecth et al. (1999), Datta Gupta & Smith (2000)). 
However, as section 2 shows it remains an open question whether part of this effect 
stems from the fact that women who actually plan to interrupt their career are more 
likely to aim at employment in the family-friendly public sector in the first place. To 
address this question, we model public- and private-sector wages for females in an 
endogenous switching framework. 
6.1  Endogenous switching model 
Let w1i and w2i be the hourly wages in the public and private sectors, respectively, let xi 
and zi be sets of explanatory variables and let β1,  β2 and  γ, be parameters to be 
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where 
*
i I  is a latent variable corresponding to the observable indicator variable i I that 
equals one if the individual is employed in the public sector and zero if the individual 
is employed in the private sector.  
Preston (1990), Hartog & Oosterbeek (1993), and Glewwe (1996) use the fully 
parametric approach suggested by Lee (1978) to study profit vs. non-profit sector 
wages in the US and the public-private wages in the Netherlands and Cote d’Ivoire,   16
respectively. The error terms are assumed to follow a trivariate normal distribution 
















        
All parameters in equation (2) can be estimated except σ21, because we never observe 
an individual in both sectors. The likelihood contribution for individual i is: 
(7) 
1
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where ( , ),  for  1,2 uj j rc o r ru j ε == . 
6.2  Identification issues 
As discussed by Dustmann & van Soest (1997), appropriate instruments and exclusion 
restrictions are crucial to obtain reliable estimates on sectoral wage differentials. 
However, if more specific inference is based on exact coefficient estimates, an 
additional issue to be considered concerns endogeneity of right-hand side variables. 
Hence, they conclude that a standard endogenous switching model is sufficient, if only 
wage differentials are of interest, though loosening up the exogeneity restrictions is 
needed if more detailed inference is wanted.   17
Based on these results, we study the following model specifications and estimate the 
following by MLE: 1) A set of separate equations with no correlation between errors, 
2) a standard endogenous switching model and 3) an endogenous switching model with 
endogenous fertility. 
As instruments we use information about the parents of the woman measured when she 
was 15-17 years. To identify the parameters of the sector choice equation, the main 
instrument is the sector of employment for the parents. In the model specifications that 
allow for endogenous fertility, the number of younger siblings is an instrument for 
fertility. To correct for the potential endogeneity of fertility, we use a two-step 
approach and subsequently correct the standard errors.  
 
7.  Results 
In this section, we present the empirical analysis. We estimate a model under the 
assumption of exogeneity represented by a probit model for sector selection and OLS 
for the wage equations. Furthermore, we estimate different specifications of the 
endogenous switching model presented above and the endogenous switching model 
correcting for the potential endogeneity of fertility. 
7.1  Specification of interruption variables 
In modelling wage functions, we follow traditional human capital theory. Our 
dependent variable is log hourly wages in 1997. Apart from the variables included in 
standard wage equations such as actual work experience, actual work experience 
squared and indicators for the level of education, we include a series of other variables 
to allow for various effects of interruptions.   18
Figure 3 illustrates the potential effects of interruptions on the earnings potential and 
emphasizes the link between the theoretical effects and our explanatory variables. We 


























rearing activities between age A0 and age A1. During the interruption, the woman fails 
to accumulate experience. This simply corresponds to a horizontal shift in the earnings 
profile. This effect is caught in our model by using actual experience as the 
explanatory variable. In addition, earnings profiles may shift downwards for two 
reasons: Firstly, the existence of a significant child penalty causes a vertical shift in the 
earnings profile, and secondly human capital may depreciate while interrupting shifting 
the earnings potential further downwards depending on the duration of the interruption. 
To account for these effects, we include an indicator for being a mother and the 





No interruptions – no child-penalty 
Experience foregone - no child-penalty 
Child-penalty, depreciation, experience 
foregone, catching up 
Child-penalty, depreciation, 
experience foregone – no catching 
up   19
illustrated in the figure.
5 Finally, there may be a catching up effect: Women may regain 
part of (or all) the lost experience, loss due to child penalty and depreciation of human 
capital when they return to work. In the literature, the period of catching up has been 
labelled “the recovery phase”. We include yearly indicators for the timing of the end of 
the last interruption spell thus allowing for the effect of the interruption to decrease in 
time. 
7.2  Estimation results from a model with no correlation between unobservables 
Table 3 shows the results from the simple OLS wage equations. Separate wage 
equations are estimated for each sector not taking the selection into account. Contrary 
to the findings of Datta Gupta & Smith (2000), we estimate a significant child penalty 
in the public sector and no significant effect of being a mother in the private sector 
when controlling for actual experience and career interruptions.
6 Also note that the 
effect of being married is insignificant in both wage equations indicating that the wage 
gap for mothers is a child gap, not a family gap. 
Considering the interruption variables, we find that long birth-related leaves are 
punished in both the public and the private sectors. However, the negative effect is 
significantly larger in the private sector. The net effect of child penalty and 
depreciation after one year of leave is larger in the private sector than the public sector. 
Note that almost all the timing indicators for birth-related leave are insignificant 
indicating that no catching up is taking place. Finally, the returns to experience vary 
substantially between the two sectors indicating differences in wage structures. 
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Table 3. Results from estimation of wage equations. 
Coefficient Std. dev. Coefficient Std. dev.
Intercept 4.8027 0.0088 4.7883 0.0100
Experience (years) 0.0049 0.0017 0.0161 0.0020
Experience squared 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001
Education (11-12 years) 0.0306 0.0047 0.0257 0.0046
Education (13-14 years) 0.1062 0.0085 0.0786 0.0096
Education (15-16 years) 0.1365 0.0073 0.1846 0.0093
Education (17 years or more) 0.2606 0.0084 0.2651 0.0107
Married (0/1) 0.0006 0.0047 -0.0008 0.0053
Province (0/1) -0.0624 0.0039 -0.0840 0.0042
Mother (0/1) -0.0242 0.0064 -0.0071 0.0073
Occupation high level (0/1) 0.1312 0.0075 0.1654 0.0092
Occupation medium level (0/1) -0.0341 0.0066 0.0495 0.0069
Occupation low level (0/1) -0.0581 0.0053 -0.0572 0.0049
Last birth-related leave t-6 (0/1) -0.0058 0.0105 0.0340 0.0134
Last birth-related leave t-5 (0/1) -0.0069 0.0112 0.0173 0.0131
Last birth-related leave t-4 (0/1) -0.0063 0.0100 0.0240 0.0123
Last birth-related leave t-3 (0/1) -0.0001 0.0097 0.0140 0.0121
Last birth-related leave t-2 (0/1) -0.0138 0.0099 0.0153 0.0108
Last birth-related leave t-1 (0/1) -0.0091 0.0076 0.0023 0.0091








Note: Bold coefficients are significant at a 5% level. In addition to child-related leave, we also include 
information on unemployment, educational leave and non-participation. 
 
Table 4 presents the results from a binomial probit on the sector selection equation. 
The estimated coefficients indicate the effect of a given variable on the probability of 
working in the public sector. Considering the family variables, it is seen that both 
being married and having a child increase the probability of working in the public 
sector. We expect these variables to be positively correlated with preferences for 
family-friendly policies. Thus, the results from this simple model indicate that women 
with preferences for family-friendly policies self-select into the public sector, i.e. the 
sector with the more family-friendly working conditions. Another indicator for this is 
the variable ‘degree of compensation’. This is the average degree of compensation 
while on maternity leave in the private sector relative to the degree of compensation in   21
the public sector (which is always 100%). This variable contributes to explaining the 
effect of structural differences between the two sectors. It is seen that a potentially 
higher degree of compensation in the private sector decreases the probability of being 
employed in the public sector. Turning to education, we see that women with a short or 
medium length education (13-16 years) have the highest probability of working in the 
public sector. This is for example teachers and nurses. Furthermore, we include the 
individual difference in predicted log wages between the public sector and the private 
sector as an explanatory variable. We use predictions from the wage equations 
described above. It is seen that an increase in wages in the public sector relative to 
wages in the private sector increases the probability of working in the public sector. 
This result together with the positive coefficient to the indicator for being a mother 
lead us to conclude that women self-select into the sector matching their preferences 
for working conditions better and that high penalties for child-related leaves in one 
sector relative to the other sector induce women with preferences for taking these types 
of leave to chose the sector where this is less costly.  
Finally, the coefficients to the variables indicating whether the parents of the woman 
were employed in the public sector when the woman was young (15-17 years) are both 
positive and significant. Note that these variables are used as exclusion restrictions for 
the choice of sector in the ESM-models.   
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Table 4. Results from estimation of probit selection equation. 
Coefficient Std. dev.
Intercept 1.1505 0.1354
Experience (years) 0.0037 0.0066
Experience squared -0.0001 0.0003
Education (11-12 years) 0.1765 0.0181
Education (13-14 years) 0.6485 0.0336
Education (15-16 years) 0.9913 0.0339
Education (17 years or more) 0.2902 0.0412
Owner of real estate (0/1) -0.1580 0.0168
Married (0/1) 0.0416 0.0184
Province (0/1) 0.0122 0.0167
Mother (0/1) 0.4219 0.0199
Mother employed in public sector (0/1) 0.1073 0.0165
Father employed in public sector (0/1) 0.0788 0.0243
1.4236 0.2646
Degree of compensation -0.0273 0.0021





2 1 ˆ ln ˆ ln w w −
 
Note: Bold coefficients are significant at a 5% level. 
 
7.3  Estimation results from the endogenous switching model 
The results from the standard endogenous switching model are shown in table 5. Here, 
the selection and wage equations are modelled simultaneously allowing for correlation 
of the effects of the unobserved characteristics and this has changed the results 
considerably. The most striking difference between the model without correlation 
between the effects of unobservables and the endogenous switching model is seen in 
the child indicators: For the public sector, allowing for endogenous sector selection 
turns the child penalty into a child premium and the depreciation rate is no longer 
significantly negative. Furthermore, the coefficients to the timing indicators show signs 
of catching up: Recent leaves are punished in terms of wages but the effect declines in 
time. In the private sector, the insignificant effect of being a mother is turned into a 
significant child penalty. Also, the results indicate that long birth-related leaves are 
punished wage-wise (depreciation effect) and the magnitude of the coefficient has   23
increased. However, the timing indicators for birth-related leave counteract the 
negative effect of taking long leaves. Note that the differences between the coefficients 
to the timing indicators are not significant. In fact, the positive timing indicators will 
exactly outweigh the wage penalty for the typical birth-related leave of 26 weeks! That 
is, only birth-related leaves exceeding the norm seem to be punished. Albrecht et al. 
(1999) interpret this as signaling. 
Considering the coefficients in the selection equation, most of them seem to be 
sensitive to simultaneous modelling as well. The effect of being a mother is still 
significant but much smaller, and the effect of being married is now insignificant.  
Furthermore, the coefficient to predicted log wage differences has increased 
considerably while the magnitude of the coefficient to degree of compensation 
decreases. The effect of education changes completely; only the coefficients to high 
level education (15-16 years, 17 years or more) are significant and the coefficient to 17 
years of education or more has turned negative. 
We find evidence of positive selection on unobservables both into the private and the 
public sectors. In general, this means that individuals working in the public sector have 
unobserved characteristics that increase wages in the public sector and likewise for the 
private sector. In particular, the change in the coefficient to the motherhood indicator 
in the private sector wage equation seems to be caused by the fact that privately 
employed mothers are well off in terms of unobserved characteristics! This would 
cause the coefficient to the mother indicator to be less negative were this correlation 
not taken into account. In the public sector, the sign of the child indicator moves in the 
opposite direction meaning that women with children are on average endowed with 
unfavourable unobserved characteristics.   24
Table 5. Results from estimation of the endogenous switching model (ESM). 
Coefficient Std. dev. Coefficient Std. dev.Coefficient Std. dev.
Intercept 1.2128 0.1029 4.4528 0.0109 4.7060 0.0103
Experience (years) 0.0149 0.0057 0.0106 0.0019 0.0123 0.0020
Experience squared -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
Education (11-12 years) -0.0060 0.0190 0.0598 0.0052 -0.0006 0.0054
Education (13-14 years) -0.0647 0.0415 0.1995 0.0098 -0.0165 0.0107
Education (15-16 years) 0.0855 0.0414 0.2766 0.0089 0.0323 0.0101
Education (17 years or more) -0.1069 0.0384 0.3385 0.0099 0.1777 0.0118
Owner of real estate (0/1) 0.0080 0.0186 0.0025 0.0050 0.0464 0.0054
Married (0/1) -0.0042 0.0194 0.0081 0.0053 -0.0076 0.0059
Province (0/1) -0.0461 0.0157 -0.0604 0.0044 -0.0800 0.0048
Mother (0/1) 0.0920 0.0229 0.0304 0.0069 -0.0597 0.0075
Mother empl. in public sector (0/1) 0.0493 0.0119
Father empl.  in public sector (0/1) 0.0356 0.0173
Degree of compensation -0.0209 0.0016
2.8212 0.1197
Occupation high level (0/1) 0.1712 0.0083 0.1438 0.0103
Occupation medium level (0/1) 0.0238 0.0071 -0.0095 0.0069
Occupation low level (0/1) -0.0136 0.0052 -0.0722 0.0051
Last birth-related leave t-6 (0/1) -0.0205 0.0112 0.0364 0.0117
Last birth-related leave t-5 (0/1) -0.0198 0.0106 0.0281 0.0115
Last birth-related leave t-4 (0/1) -0.0193 0.0100 0.0336 0.0107
Last birth-related leave t-3 (0/1) -0.0373 0.0098 0.0546 0.0107
Last birth-related leave t-2 (0/1) -0.0506 0.0096 0.0547 0.0101
Last birth-related leave t-1 (0/1) -0.0515 0.0077 0.0435 0.0086






# observations 29430 13988 15442
-16807
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Note: Bold coefficients are significant at a 5% level. In addition to child-related leave, we also include 
information on unemployment, educational leave and non-participation. 
 
To investigate the effect of being a mother further, we allow the child penalty to vary 
with levels of education. That is, we include cross terms between the mother indicator 
and indicators for high school (11-12 years), short further education (13-14), medium-
level education (15-16 years) and high-level education (more than 16 years).  The   25
effect of having children if the individual has a medium level education is thus the 
coefficient to the mother indicator plus the coefficient to the cross term. The results are 
shown in table 6. Except for the coefficient to the degree of compensation, the 
coefficients to the variables other than the dummy for being a mother are only slightly 
affected by the inclusion of cross terms. However, there seems to be large variations in 
the effect of having a child for women with different levels of education: In the public 
sector, women with a high level education and children have 9% higher wage growth 
than women without children. How could this be? For males, it is consistently found 
that individuals with children earn more than their peers without children (cf. Jacobsen 
& Rayak (1996), Korenman  & Neumark (1991), Loh (1996), and Rosholm & Smith 
(1996)). The usual argument, which may carry over to the case of women in the public 
sector, is that individuals with children are less mobile and value stable income more. 
Therefore, it is less risky for the employer to invest in the accumulation of human 
capital for individuals with children. Also, since pay rises in the public sector are 
closely linked to tenure, stability is rewarded.  
In the private sector, all women are punished for having children no matter the level of 
education but women with high-level educations are punished less. The extra child 
premium in the public sector and the smaller child penalty in the private sector for 
highly educated women could be explained by advantageous unobserved 
characteristics (e.g. motivation or responsibility) being correlated with level of 
education. Furthermore, jobs held by highly educated may consist of more complex 
tasks making it more difficult to replace the individual holding the position, thus 
increasing the bargaining power of the employee. In conclusion, allowing for 
heterogeneity in levels of education really does make a difference in identification of 
the effect of having children.   26
Table 6. Results from estimation of the ESM allowing for heterogeneity by education. 
Coefficient Std. dev. Coefficient Std. dev. Coefficient Std. dev.
Intercept 1.2312 0.1010 4.4256 0.0114 4.6961 0.0107
Experience (years) 0.0154 0.0056 0.0111 0.0019 0.0107 0.0020
Experience squared -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Education (11-12 years) -0.0138 0.0187 0.1010 0.0068 0.0149 0.0069
Education (13-14 years) -0.0762 0.0396 0.2069 0.0137 0.0516 0.0135
Education (15-16 years) 0.0782 0.0398 0.3002 0.0114 0.0783 0.0125
Education (17 years or more) -0.0994 0.0370 0.3309 0.0121 0.1912 0.0133
Owner of real estate (0/1) 0.0050 0.0180 0.0025 0.0050 0.0471 0.0054
Married (0/1) -0.0028 0.0189 0.0082 0.0053 -0.0073 0.0059
Province (0/1) -0.0414 0.0153 -0.0605 0.0044 -0.0793 0.0048
Mother (0/1) 0.0837 0.0222 0.0642 0.0087 -0.0292 0.0092
Mother*education (11-12 years) -0.0686 0.0087 -0.0314 0.0089
Mother*education (13-14 years) -0.0089 0.0158 -0.1288 0.0173
Mother*education (15-16 years) -0.0321 0.0131 -0.1013 0.0159
Mother*education (17 years or more) 0.0346 0.0152 -0.0227 0.0185
Mother empl. in public sector (0/1) 0.0486 0.0119
Father empl. in public sector (0/1) 0.0344 0.0173
Degree of compensation -0.0212 0.0016
2.7548 0.1077
Occupation high level (0/1) 0.1684 0.0083 0.1453 0.0103
Occupation medium level (0/1) 0.0225 0.0071 -0.0065 0.0070
Occupation low level (0/1) -0.0122 0.0053 -0.0730 0.0051
Last birth-related leave t-6 (0/1) -0.0192 0.0113 0.0421 0.0118
Last birth-related leave t-5 (0/1) -0.0183 0.0108 0.0328 0.0116
Last birth-related leave t-4 (0/1) -0.0176 0.0102 0.0390 0.0108
Last birth-related leave t-3 (0/1) -0.0357 0.0099 0.0616 0.0108
Last birth-related leave t-2 (0/1) -0.0493 0.0097 0.0619 0.0102
Last birth-related leave t-1 (0/1) -0.0490 0.0078 0.0506 0.0087









Selection equation Wage equation Wage equation
Public sector Private sector
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Note: Bold coefficients are significant at a 5% level. In addition to child-related leave, we also include 
information on unemployment, educational leave and non-participation. 
 
We also modelled the endogenous switching model allowing for differences in the 
effect of motherhood varying with age at first birth. However, we found no significant   27
differences between the child penalty/premium for the different categories of age at 
first birth. 
The indicator for being a mother may cause another potential endogeneity problem. It 
is likely that unobserved characteristics explaining the choice of having children are 
correlated with unobservables explaining the choice of sector or wages. To account for 
that, we apply the two-step approach described in section 6. Our instrument is the 
number of siblings living at home while the woman was between 15 and 17 years of 
age. The coefficient of the instrument turns out to be significantly negative when 
modelling the choice of having children using a probit specification. The share of 
correct predictions in the model is 0.7861. However, as can be seen from Table 7, the 
qualitative results of being a mother do not change at all. The other coefficients are 
robust as well.   
Table 7. Motherhood indicators from the endogenous switching model with 
endogenous fertility. 
Coefficient Std. dev. Coefficient Std. dev. Coefficient Std. dev.
Mother (0/1) 0.0836 0.0222 0.0642 0.0087 -0.0292 0.0092
Mother*education (11-12 years) -0.0686 0.0087 -0.0314 0.0089
Mother*education (13-14 years) -0.0088 0.0158 -0.1288 0.0173
Mother*education (15-16 years) -0.0322 0.0131 -0.1013 0.0159
Mother*education (17 years or more) 0.0346 0.0152 -0.0226 0.0185
Selection equation Wage equation Wage equation
Public sector Private sector
 
Note: Bold coefficients are significant at a 5% level. 
 
7.4  Wage profiles  
To illustrate the effect of child-related career interruptions, we present different wage 
profiles based on the results from the ESM model with endogenous fertility.
7 We 
consider a woman with a medium length higher education (15-16 years), who enters   28
the labour market at the age of 25. At 28 she gives birth to her first child, and we study 
the cases where she takes 6 and 12 months of birth-related leave, respectively. 
Changing the level of education would affect only the level of the curve and the 
vertical shift, not the profile over age. 
Figure 4 presents the wage profiles for the public sector. It is seen that both women 
taking 6 and 12 months of leave are punished temporarily for interrupting due to 
depreciation of human capital. However, one year after giving birth the recovery phase 
sets in and after 4 years full catching up is achieved. Since the depreciation effect for 
publicly employed women is small, there is almost no difference between the predicted 
wages of women taking 6 or 12 months of leave. 
 

























The consequence of a birth-related interruption crucially depends on the education of 
the woman. Mothers with 11-12 years of education never catch up, whereas mothers 
with long further education (17-18 years) earn higher wages than childless women.
8    29
Figure 5 presents the wage profiles for the private sector. In this case, there is a large 
child penalty and a strong depreciation effect. Not much catching up takes place. No 
matter the level of education, women who choose birth-related career interruptions are 
punished severely in terms of wages, and this effect does not seem to vanish over time. 
The punishment is largest for women with 13-14 or 15-16 years of education, and it is 
smallest for those with long further education and those with 10 years or below.  
 

























8.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate how the family gap is influenced by self-selection into 
sectors with family-friendly policies. We analyse the case of the public vs. private 
sector in Denmark. We find that neglecting self-selection into sectors tends to 
understate the effect of birth-related interruptions in both sectors. Pooling across 
sectors would understate the effects even more, since the child penalty would be driven 
to zero.   30
We analyse the earnings effects of birth-related interruptions in the public and private 
sectors, while focusing on self-selection due to motherhood, wage compensation 
during leave expected wage gains as well as unobservables. We allow for 
heterogeneous effects of motherhood for individuals with different levels of education, 
and we correct for the possible endogeneity of fertility by using an instrumental 
variable approach.  
As expected, we find that motherhood as well as lower potential compensation in case 
of maternity leave in the private sector, increases the probability of being employed in 
the public sector, regardless of the specification of the model. In the wage functions, 
we find a child premium in the public sector and a child penalty in the private sector 
after correction for both sorts of endogeneity and these effects vary substantially with 
level of education. Regarding birth-related leave, we find no evidence of depreciation 
in the public sector but most women experience a negative wage effect that dies out 
over time. Women with the female-dominated medium length educations (nurses, 
pedagogues and teachers) catch up completely, and women working in the public 
sector with long further educations are not at all punished wage-wise for interrupting 
their career to have a child. In the private sector, women loose earnings no matter the 
level of education and these losses are not reduced subsequently.  
We find positive selection on unobserved characteristics in both the public and the 
private sectors and in general we find that the parameters are sensitive to the 
endogenous choice of sector, but not to the potential endogeneity of fertility. The 
results from the endogenous switching model support the hypotheses that women self-
select into the sector matching their preferences better and that high penalties for child-
related leaves in one sector relative to the other sector induce women with preferences 
for taking these types of leave to chose the sector where this is less costly.   31
Returning to the question posed in the title of the paper, we must conclude that the gap 
in family-friendly policies affects the sector choice of women.  And it does indeed 
affect the estimated family gap in earnings. Allowing for self-selection increases the 
sector difference in child penalties significantly. It changes the child penalty into a 
premium in the public sector, whereas it leads to a larger child penalty in the private 
sector. It seems probable, then, that mothers employed in the private sector are 
endowed with wage-increasing unobservables, whereas mothers employed in the 
public sector are endowed with less favourable unobserved characteristics. This tends 
to suggest that the family-friendly policies in the public sector attract ‘bad manpower’ 
in terms of unobserved characteristics, whereas the opposite is the case in the private 
sector.   
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APPENDIX 1. The Danish leave schemes, 1981-1996.  
During the period of observation, there have been considerable changes in the Danish 
leave schemes towards an increasingly generous system in terms of the length of the 
leaves. In the following, the most substantial changes are described.  
In 1981, mothers were eligible for 18 weeks of maternity leave: 4 weeks before giving 
birth and 14 weeks after (cf. www.kvinfo.dk). The law was changed in 1984 (Statute 
no. 63 per 21/02/1984, ‘Bekendtgørelse af Lov om barselsorlov m.v.’) extending the 
leave with 10 weeks of parental leave that could be shared between the parents, 
resulting in a maximum of 28 weeks of leave for the mother. In 1990, fathers were 
allowed 2 weeks of leave during the first 14 weeks after the birth, which could not be 
transferred to the mother (Statute no. 852 per 20/12/1989, ‘Lov om dagpenge ved 
sygdom eller fødsel’). An important point is that law protects individuals who have set 
forth demands for or are already in maternity or paternity leave against being fired (cf. 
Statute no. 63 per 21/02/1984, ‘Bekendtgørelse af Lov om barselsorlov m.v.’). During 
the maternity and parental leave all parents on leave are eligible for benefits 
corresponding to 90% of their former salary (up to a maximum). However, due to 
legislation in 1989 all employees in the public sector receive full salary during 
maternity/parental leave. 
In 1994, in addition to the existing parental leave schemes, three new types of publicly 
subsidized leave schemes were introduced: Child-rearing leave, sabbatical leave and 
educational leave (Statute no 435 per 30/06/1993, ‘Lov om orlov’). Child-rearing leave 
was aimed at individuals who wanted to withdraw temporarily from the labour force in 
order to take care of their children. Therefore, the law limited the use of publicly 
provided childcare facilities for children of individuals in child-rearing leave. The 
leave scheme was open to both employed and non-employed individuals and amounted   35
to a maximum of 52 weeks per child aged 0-8 years for women in employment and 26 
weeks for non-employed. In 1994, fully insured participants could receive 80% of the 
maximum unemployment benefit, but in 1995 this was reduced to 70% (Statute no. 
1178 per 27/12/1994 ‘Bekendtgørelse om orlov til uddannelse, sabbat og 
børnepasning’). Individuals in child-rearing leave also received job protection by law.  
Contrary to child-rearing leave, taking up sabbatical leave would not restrict the 
individual’s use of publicly provided services or more generally lay down conditions 
for the individual’s everyday. Therefore, sabbatical leave could, in principle, be a 
substitute for child-rearing leave. However, only employed individuals could 
participate in the leave scheme and it was required that the employer hired an 
unemployed individual to fill in for the individual on leave. Sabbatical leave could be 
taken for 52 weeks and the benefits scheme corresponded to the scheme for child-
rearing leave.  
Educational leave could, of course, only be granted if the individual was actually 
taking up education. Also, only types of education approved by the government were 
allowed for; this would typically exclude education at university level. Educational 
leave amounted to a maximum of 52 weeks and participants could receive the 
maximum earnings replacement. 
Clearly, the extended maternity leave and the introduction of child rearing and 
sabbatical leave made it possible for women to stay at home and take care of their 
children for a longer period.   36
APPENDIX 2.  Descriptive statistics for central variables. 
 





1 In line with this finding, a consultancy report from SBK Scandinavia showed that in 
contrast to their privately employed peers, females employed as trade and office 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Hourly wage (DKK)+A6 124.741 39.705 129.110 45.659
Age (years) 31.742 5.645 29.800 5.785
Education (<11 years) 0.219 0.414 0.342 0.474
Education (11-12 years) 0.418 0.493 0.510 0.500
Education (13-14 years) 0.105 0.306 0.048 0.214
Education (15-16 years) 0.198 0.399 0.057 0.231
Education (> 16 years) 0.060 0.237 0.043 0.203
Province 0.636 0.481 0.624 0.484
Owner of real estate 0.421 0.494 0.414 0.492
Occupation top level 0.006 0.076 0.009 0.094
Occupation high level 0.134 0.340 0.058 0.234
Occupation medium level 0.270 0.444 0.159 0.366
Occupation low level 0.464 0.499 0.564 0.496
Married (0/1) 0.477 0.499 0.390 0.488
Child (0/1) 0.615 0.487 0.480 0.500
Degree of compensation (potential) 0.584 0.057 0.606 0.048
Duration of latest birth-related leave (weeks) 18.688 21.749 13.898 19.617
Latest birth-related leave in 84 (0/1) 0.010 0.098 0.007 0.086
Latest birth-related leave in 85 (0/1) 0.013 0.111 0.010 0.099
Latest birth-related leave in 86 (0/1) 0.018 0.132 0.013 0.112
Latest birth-related leave in 87 (0/1) 0.023 0.149 0.013 0.115
Latest birth-related leave in 88 (0/1) 0.025 0.156 0.017 0.128
Latest birth-related leave in 89 (0/1) 0.032 0.176 0.020 0.140
Latest birth-related leave in 90 (0/1) 0.035 0.184 0.024 0.153
Latest birth-related leave in 91 (0/1) 0.037 0.189 0.029 0.169
Latest birth-related leave in 92 (0/1) 0.047 0.212 0.034 0.182
Latest birth-related leave in 93 (0/1) 0.054 0.227 0.040 0.197
Latest birth-related leave in 94 (0/1) 0.056 0.230 0.048 0.214
Latest birth-related leave in 95 (0/1) 0.067 0.250 0.061 0.240
Latest birth-related leave in 96 (0/1) 0.133 0.340 0.116 0.320
Mother public sector (0/1) 0.345 0.476 0.300 0.458
Father public sector (0/1) 0.127 0.333 0.099 0.299
N 13988 15442
Public Sector Private Sector  37
                                                                                                                                                                        
workers (Handel og Kontor) in the public sector do not experience increased risk of 
marginalization following a period of child-rearing leave.  
2 In total, real wages declined by 3% over the period. In addition, a small but 
increasing amount has been locally negotiated. 
3 Though a majority of women start their labour market career in the private sector, the 
likelihood of a transition to the public sector is more than double of the likelihood of 
going in the opposite direction. 
4  Most often, children from separated homes live with their mother. Moreover, in 1996 
the number of adoptions amounted to only 600 in total. In our sample this would 
amount to approximately 30 adoptions in 1996. 
5 In addition to birth-related leave, we account for unemployment, educational leave, 
child-rearing and sabbatical leave and non-participation. Results are only reported for 
leave related to children. 
6 Remember, though, that we do not model the participate decision. 
7 All relevant coefficients are used to draw the wage profile no matter whether they are 
significant. 
8 The same variation over education is seen in the papers by Datta Gupta & Smith 
(2002) and Albrecht et al. (1999), though the net effect of interruptions on wages is 
only positive for short periods of leave. 